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Abstract
This paper studies within-family decision making regarding investment in income
protection for surviving spouses. A change in US pension law (the Retirement
Equity Act of 1984) is used as an instrument to derive predictions both from a
simple Nash-bargaining model of the household and from the classical single-
utility-function model of the household. This law change gave spouses of married
pension-plan participants the right to survivor benefits unless they explicitly
waived this right. The predictions of the classical model are rejected in favor of
the predictions of the Nash-bargaining model in the data.







This paper is based on the first chapter of my Ph.D. Thesis from Massachusetts
Institute of Technology. I would like to thank my advisors, Peter Diamond and
Jon Gruber, for helpful comments and encouragement while writing this paper.
Valuable comments from Emek Basker, Esther Duflo, Kevin Lang and from
participants of the lunches and seminars at MIT, Toronto, Louvain, Bocconi,
Syracuse and Texas A&M are also acknowledged. The financial support from
Yrjö Jahnsson Foundation, Emil Aaltonen Foundation, Finnish Cultural
Foundation and Center for Retirement Research at Boston College are gratefully
acknowledged.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Most economic theory assumes that household behavior is determined by a
fully rational agent maximizing a single household utility function. While for
most purposes this assumption has been proven to be an extremely powerful
way of describing actual behavior, in recent decades there have been at least
two sets of challenges to this model. The ﬁrst, behavioral economics, chal-
lenges the rationality assumption. The second set of challenges questions
the notion that the behavior of multi-person household can be described as
decisions made by a (possibly benevolent) dictator within a household. It
posits an alternative view: the decisions taken by a household can be char-
acterized by a more complicated process that takes explicitly into account
the multi-decision maker structure of the household. Both sets of challenges
share the view that there are situations that merit analysis beyond this
simple paradigm. This paper considers one such application, in which the
single-utility function model is unsatisfactory: the analysis of a government
policy intended to redistribute resources within a family.
The speciﬁc issue analyzed in this paper is a married couples’ choice of
the amount of survivor protection to be provided to a surviving spouse after
the death of her partner.1 The potential conﬂict of interest between spouses
rises from the fact that providing protection to a surviving spouse is costly
(e.g. life insurance is not free). This means that the more survivor pro-
tection is provided, the less resources the household has available in other
states of the world. This simple observation, while potentially compatible
with the single-utility-function framework, illustrates the potential for con-
ﬂicting interests between spouses. More generally, many decisions within
a household have a potential for conﬂict between spouses or between other
members of the household.2
1From now on, we will use convention that the husband is the spouse who, having been
the primary earner, is more likely to die earlier. While the reverse situation is relevant
for some couples, this is still (especially for the cohorts used in the empirical analysis)
overwhelmingly more typical. Furthermore, the law change that is studied in this paper,
while written in gender-neutral terms, was explicitly targeted to increase the protection
of widows after the death of their husbands.
2Some examples studied in the literature are labor supply and labor force participa-
tion decisions of spouses, consumption allocations between diﬀerent goods, health and
educational investments, bequests and child labor.The application studied in this paper is the spousal signature require-
ments of the Retirement Equity Act (REA) of 1984. This requirement man-
dated that a married pension plan participant, when retiring, must choose
his pension payment in a form of a joint-and-1
2 survivor annuity unless his
spouse signs a notarized consent form waiving her right to this survivor pro-
tection.3 The mandate aﬀected only pension plan participants who started
receiving their pensions after January 1, 1985.
In the theoretical part of the paper, a Nash-bargaining model of family
decision making is used to analyze the speciﬁce ﬀects of this law change for
the selection of survivor annuities, life insurance holdings and savings. The
law change is interpreted as having changed spouses’ relative outside options.
The model predicts that the law change would increase the selection of the
survivor annuities and increase life insurance holdings for most households.
The eﬀect on the savings behavior is indeterminate. These predictions of
the Nash-bargaining model are contrasted with the stark prediction of the
classical model that the law would have had no eﬀect since the household
budget set is unchanged.4 Thus this exogenous law change provides a well-
identiﬁed empirical strategy for testing the predictions of the bargaining
model against the predictions of the classical model.5
In the empirical part of the paper, several cross-section datasets are used
to study these predictions. The eﬀect on the survivor annuity selection is
studied using the Current Population Survey (CPS) December 1989 Pension
3A joint—and-
1
2 survivor annuity is an annuity that pays a ﬁxed income stream as long
as the primary annuitant (the pension plan participant) is alive and 50% of this stream as a
survivor beneﬁt for his spouse after his death as long as she is alive. A typical alternative
to the survivor annuity is a single life annuity that pays a higher ﬁxed income stream
during the participant’s lifetime. The terms ”joint annuity” and ”survivor annuity” are
used interchangeably in this paper.
4Since the joint-and-
1
2 survivor annuity was in the budget set by law (ERISA of 1974).
5Most of the existing literature that tries to test between alternative models of house-
hold behavior use as their identiﬁcation sources variables that could easily be interpreted
as being endogenous to the decision (like the relative income shares of the husband and
wife). Thus, the rejections of the classical model in these papers can be due to this problem
of identiﬁcation strategy. This point is powerfully extended in Duﬂo (2000). Two studies
that use similar natural experiment strategies as this paper are the Duﬂo paper and Lund-
berg, Pollak and Wales (1996). In the former the natural experiment was an expansion of
pension beneﬁts in South Africa. In the latter the natural experiment was a policy change
in the UK, which changed the Child Beneﬁt from tax credits to a direct payment to the
mother. Interesting more structural tests of the model are derived in several papers by
Chiappori and co-authors (e.g, Chiappori and Browning 1998). All three papers reject
the classical single utility function view of the household.
2Beneﬁt Survey and combination of the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS)
and the Assets and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old (AHEAD).6
These results show that the law change increased the selection of survivor an-
nuities by approximately 7 percentage points (a 10 percent increase). Results
from HRS-AHEAD data indicate that the aﬀected households increased their
life insurance holding by approximately $5,000 (this corresponds to approx-
imately 25% of median life insurance holdings of the aﬀected group). These
joint-annuitization and life insurance ﬁndings support the Nash-bargaining
theory over the classical single utility maximization model.
2 Survivor protection: legislation and economic
evidence
Protection of surviving spouses can be provided by several instruments: pri-
vately purchased annuities, survivor annuities from private pensions, public
pensions (Social Security), life insurance and savings. It is worth noting
that many of these instruments can used for motives other than survivor
protection. Several authors have argued that bequest motives are impor-
tant explanations for wealth accumulation (savings behavior) and for life
insurance holdings (e.g., Bernheim 1991, Brown 1999, Kotlikoﬀ 1998). Most
households rely substantially on Social Security, which provides a real joint-
annuity for married retirees. The surviving spouse in a typical married
couple receives two thirds of the couple’s Social Security beneﬁts.7
Prior to REA, all private-sector and union pension plans in the United
States were aﬀected by the Employment Retirement Income Security Act
6When used together these datasets will be referred as HRS-AHEAD data. Preliminary
release data from HRS wave 1998 is used and therefore the following disclaimer applies:
”This analysis uses HRS Preliminary Release data. These data have not been cleaned
and may contain errors that will be corrected in the ﬁnal Public Release version of the
dataset.”
7This is the case when the Social Security beneﬁts, both before and after the death
of primary earner, are based on the earnings record of only one of the spouses. In that
case the couple gets 150% of the Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) while the survivor gets
100% of the PIA. The replacement rate is lower for a two-earner couple.
3(ERISA) of 1974.8 With respect to survivor annuities, ERISA required that
if the pension plan’s primary form of pension payout was an annuity, then
the default option for married participants must be a joint-and-1
2 survivor
annuity.9 Pension plan participants were free to choose other pay-out op-
tions without consulting their spouses. Holden and Nicholson (1998), using
New Beneﬁciary Survey data, show that ERISA increased the selection of
survivor annuities by married male pension plan participants from 48.1%
to 63.9%. Unfortunately these data cannot be used to disentangle the two
eﬀects of ERISA: the mandate that survivor beneﬁts must be an option
(increased availability) and the eﬀect of the default choice.10
The Retirement Equity Act (REA) of 1984 was a major revision of the
original ERISA legislation. While it aﬀected vesting requirements, minimum
age requirements for pension plan participation, years of service calculations
and other more administrative aspects of the covered pension plans, it also
included two provisions that were explicitly meant to redistribute resources
within a family.11 It mandated the provision of pre-retirement and post-
retirement survivor annuities unless the spouse aﬀected signed a consent
form in the presence of a notary public or a pension plan administrator.
The pre-retirement survivor annuity provision required that pension plans
provide survivor coverage for a spouses if the participant died before his re-
tirement unless the spouse waived this beneﬁt. The decision to decline the
pre-retirement annuity could be made at any time after the year of partici-
pant’s 35th birthday and before his death. While the eﬀects of the mandate
to provide pre-retirement annuities is interesting, it is beyond scope of this
paper.12
8ERISA created standards for several aspects of pension plans including ﬁduciary duty,
vesting requirements and reporting requirements. Compliance with the ERISA regulations
is required for a pension plan to enjoy beneﬁcial tax treatment.
9Before ERISA pension plans were not required to provide survivor annuities.
10A recent paper by Madrian and Shea (2000) provides evidence on the eﬀect of the
default choice on the investment decision made by 401(k) plan participants. They ﬁnd
that the choice of default option has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on retirement related investment
decisions.
11In the public discussion around that time, the Retirement Equity Act was also dubbed
as the ”Women’s Pension Law”.
12One justiﬁcation for this choice is that the post-retirement annuity selection situation
is such that the selection will have an immediate eﬀect on household income, while the
decision on the pre-retirement annuity would only aﬀect the household income through
change in pension beneﬁt sp e r h a p sa sl a t ea s3 0y e a r sf r o mt h es e l e c t i o nd a t e .
4This paper will focus on the post-retirement survivor-annuities mandate.
This requirement speciﬁed that employers must provide married participants
with a notice form explaining the choice (typically between a single life
annuity and a joint-and-survivor annuity; in some a cases lump-sum payment
is also oﬀered) and the rights of the parties involved at least 90 days before
start of the pension payments. The mandated default form of joint-and-
survivor annuity provided 50% of the beneﬁt received when the participant
was alive to his spouse after his death. This requirement aﬀected all deﬁned-
beneﬁt plans and most deﬁned-contribution plans.13 For the empirical part
of the paper, it is important to note that state and local government pension
plans were not aﬀected by REA. The federal government pension plan had a
similar requirement change eﬀe c t i v ea ts a m et i m et h a n k st ot h eC i v i lS e r v i c e
Retirement Spouse Equity Act of 1984.
For a typical retiring worker, the eﬀect of selecting a joint-and-survivor
annuity over a single life annuity is a reduction in pension beneﬁts of ap-
proximately 10% (based on TIAA-CREF annuity pricing table, from TIAA-
CREF 1996). Pensions where the payments had started before January 1,
1985, were unaﬀected by these survivor annuity requirements.
3 Theoretical models of household decision mak-
ing and the Retirement Equity Act
Three simple models of household decision making are compared in this
section with respect to their predictions on the eﬀects of the signature re-
quirement of the Retirement Equity Act. The models are the classical single
utility function model, an “almost dictatorial” model and a Nash-bargaining
model. Because each of these three models gives diﬀerent predictions regard-
ing the eﬀects of the signature requirement they can be tested empirically.
13Among deﬁned-contribution plans, all the money-purchase pension plans were aﬀected
by the provision. Under certain limited circumstances, proﬁt-sharing and stock-bonus
plans were not aﬀected (Schechter 1985). It is also worthwhile to notice that the deﬁned
beneﬁt plans that did not provide the option to annuitize the pension wealth were not
aﬀected by this requirement.
53.1 The economic environment
For simplicity a two-period structure of the world is assumed. In the ﬁrst
period, both spouses are alive with probability one. In the second period,
the husband is alive with probability (1−p) and the wife is alive with prob-
ability one. Period 1 in the model presents early retirement and period 2
late retirement. In the ﬁrst period the household must decide how much
of its endowment to consume now, and how much to allocate to diﬀerent
states of the world in period 2. A complete market structure is assumed,
so the household can use risk-free bonds and life insurance to transfer re-
sources to period 2 with no short-selling constraints.14 Also for simplicity,
the household decision-making process is assumed to be fully rational and
the utility functions of household members (or the household utility function
in the case of the classical model) are assumed to be of the time-separable
expected utility form. Furthermore, household members are assumed to have
no bequest motives.
The household is assumed to have an exogenously given endowment W.
The complete and perfect nature of ﬁnancial markets with no short-selling
constraints imply that the source of the endowment is irrelevant to the
choice set; only the actuarial present value of all income streams matters.
Thus, for example, the fact that Social Security provides survivor annuities
is irrelevant in this environment, since this can be fully undone by short
sales of life insurance on the husband’s life.15
3.2 Classical single utility function maximization
In this case, the household maximizes
U(c1,B,I)=u(c1)+( 1− p)v(B)+p˜ v(B + I) (1)




14In this environment, the same state space is spanned either by life-insurance and
risk-free bonds or by single-life and joint-life annuities. In the real world the situation
is more complicated, due to the lumpiness of the pension annuity selection, diﬀerences
in the pricing of annuities and life insurance and rationing/non-linear pricing in the life
insurance market.
15This implicitly assumes that the same pricing of social security is available in the
market.
6where c1 is the current period consumption, B is the amount of the safe bond
and I is the amount of life insurance, q is the price of life insurance and R
is the real discount rate. Note that the utility function over consumption in
period 2 is allowed to be state-dependent.
This model makes a stark prediction with respect to the signature re-
quirement: it should have absolutely no eﬀect on the decisions that the
household makes since the budget set remains unaﬀected.16
3.3 “Almost Dictatorial” model
A slight generalization of the classical model has a (possibly altruistic) hus-
band make all the economic decisions in the family, while the wife has her
own utility function (that is irrelevant to the household’s decisions). So
while she has her own preferences, we observe only the choices made ac-
cording to husband’s preferences. Since the husband has ample tools in this
model to undo any increase in joint annuitization by cancelling life insurance
(or selling it short) he may choose not to bother to get his wife’s signature
to forego the survivor annuity. Instead he can completely oﬀset this increase
in survivor protection by cancelling his life insurance (or by short-selling life
insurance). This simple model provides justiﬁcation for the investigation,
in the empirical part of the paper, of possible oﬀsetting behavior on the
life-insurance margin.
An extension of this model to the case in which the wife has a veto-
right after the legislation on the annuity choice (but no say on any other
decision of the household) and in which the short-selling constraints could
bind, predicts that the legislation might have a real eﬀect on the allocation
of households resources, since the husband might not be able to completely
undo the eﬀect of increased annuitization. In this case, in the event of
accepting the default allocation, life insurance holdings decline either fully
16This prediction holds as long as the law change does not change the utility function of
the household. An alternative way to specify the decision problem is to parametrize the
utility function diﬀerently in two states of the world: a separate utility function depending
on whether the signature requirement is in eﬀect. In ﬁrst instance this looks similar
to the classical introductory economics example on how preferences over sunlotion and
umbrellas might change depending on the weather forecast. However, in this particular
application the separately-parametrized utility function would be just an alternative way
to parametrize the notion of bargaining power.
7oﬀsetting the change or reaching zero. This assumes the same pricing in
pension alternatives and in market pricing of life insurance.
3.4 Bargaining model
The Nash bargaining models (Manser and Brown 1980, McElroy and Horney
1981) and, more generally, eﬃcient contracting models (Chiappori 1988a)
of household behavior have been a topic of research in several areas of eco-
nomics in past ﬁfteen years. The applications of these models or other more
general models of household decision making to retirement-related topics
are rare, two notable exceptions being Browning (2000) on the theory side
and Lundberg and Ward-Batts (2000) on the empirical side.17 The basic
tenets of these models are that households have at least two decision makers
with separate utility functions, and that the choices households make are
Pareto-eﬃcient.
This section presents a Nash-bargaining model, but the model presented
can easily be understood to be just a special case of a more general eﬃ-
cient contracting model. All the results presented continue to hold in these
more general models. In this sense, this paper does not engage in the de-
bate of the relative merits of the Nash-bargaining assumption versus the
eﬃcient-contracting approach (Chiappori 1988b, McElroy and Horney 1990,
Chiappori 1991). While the formal model is presented and solved in the Ap-
pendix, this section provides an informal discussion of its main assumptions
and results.
In the Nash-bargaining model, both spouses are assumed to have utility
functions over their own consumptions in diﬀerent states of the world. While
altruistic linkages between spouses are assumed away in this analysis, the
results presented here apply as long as the altruistic linkages are not too
strong.18 Furthermore, it is assumed that the decision negotiated in period
17Browning (2000) models the decisions similar as studied in this paper as a non-
cooperative game. Under the assumptions used, he ﬁnds that the Nash-equilibrium of the
game can be Pareto-eﬃcient. Lundberg and Ward-Batts (2000), on the other hand, ﬁnd
that variables plausibly correlated with the respective bargaining powers of the spouses
(such as spouses’ respective education levels and age diﬀerence between spouses), have an
eﬀect on the net worth of households in the ﬁrst wave of the HRS.
18As long as on the margin both spouses would weakly prefer more of their own con-
sumption in any state of the world over more of their partner’s consumption in any state,
81 is honored in period 2, so there are no commitment problems across time-
periods.
The key determinant of the Nash-bargaining solution is the outside op-
t i o n .T h i si sd e ﬁned as the utility level that the agent would attain should
negotiations break down. In most of the Nash-bargaining literature on fam-
ily decision making, the outside options are considered to be the spouses’
respective utility levels in the case of divorce, given the institutional arrange-
ment on the sharing of household resources, as in the original McElroy and
Horney (1981) contribution. Lundberg and Pollak (1993) introduced the
notion of a non-cooperative marriage as the outside option. In the context
of this application, the non-cooperative marriage is the preferred interpreta-
tion. A non-cooperative marriage is interpreted in this context as a situation
i nw h i c hb o t hs p o u s e ss e p a r a t e l yc o nsume the income streams over which
they have property rights, and do not optimally divide household chores.
Although household chores are not explicitly modelled here, they represent
one of the wife’s bargaining chips: the threat of not providing household
services to the husband is a potential instrument in her bargaining strategy.
In the bargaining context, the signature requirement of the Retirement
Equity Act changes the relative outside options of the spouses by redistribut-
ing property rights on the income stream provided by the survivor annuity
to the wife. Before the requirement, she does not have a claim on that
income stream. This is equivalent to a redistribution from the husband’s
outside option to the wife’s outside option.
Proposition 1. REA increases the utility of wife and decreases the util-
ity of husband.
Proof: See Appendix.
This result is a direct consequence of the redistribution of outside options
by REA. Since her outside option is higher when REA is in eﬀect, her
utility in the Nash-bargaining solution will be higher. Moreover, this result
holds whether or not the household would have chosen the survivor annuity
w i t h o u tR E A .T h i si sag e n e r a lp r o p e r t y of the standard Nash-bargaining
solution: outside options always matter to the solution.
the analysis goes through, although with more notation. Similarly, household public goods
(a limit case of altruism) would only increase notation, but would not change the results
presented here.
9Proposition 2. REA increases the amount of money transferred to
the survivor state (the sum of survivor annuities and life insurance) and
increases the wife’s private consumption in periods 1 and 2. The eﬀect on
savings is ambiguous.
Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 2 basically restates Proposition 1. Since the bargaining
power is tilted towards the wife with REA, the family will consume more
items that enter positively into her utility function. Since life-insurance
holdings and survivor annuities are perfect substitutes in this model, the
prediction is only on the sum of these two.
In reality the choice of survivor annuity is a discrete choice the possible
choices typically being no survivor beneﬁts in the annuity and some selected
levels of survivor annuity (say, 50% or 100% survivor annuity). Consider the
following example: the 50% survivor annuity is the only form of survivor
annuity available, and households continuously adjust their life-insurance
holdings to arrive at the optimum.19 Households can then be divided into
three groups based on whether they would have chosen survivor beneﬁts
without REA and with REA. Table 1 Summarizes REA’s eﬀects on life-
insurance holdings.
All these eﬀects are derived from the eﬀect of REA on the amount of
resources transferred to the widowhood state (the sum of life insurance hold-
ings and the survivor annuity).20 This unambiguously increases due to REA,
since it increases wife’s threat point on the negotiation. The case of the
19In reality the pricing of survivor annuities and life insurance diﬀers. Annuities from
pension beneﬁts (both single-life and survivor annuities) are calculated using unisex life
tables. Life-insurance cost on the other hand is a function of several factors (including
health status, gender and access to group life insurance plans). For many households the
survivor annuities available through their pension plans are cheaper (especially for couples
with no access to group life-insurance markets), so for these households foregoing survivor
annuities in favor of holding similar amount of survivor protection through life insurance
would not be rational unless there is a strategic reason for this. One strategic reason
for holding life insurance instead of survivor beneﬁts might be the fact that the husband
could unilaterally cancel his life insurance policies in the future without consulting his
wife whereas he would need his wife’s consent to cancel the survivor annuity.
20In the empirical part of the paper this narrow notion of wealth available (sum of
survivor annuities and life insurance) in the survivor state is also used. In practice, many
of the household’s assets (most wealth components) in the typical household would be
available to the widow. However, in practice we don’t know what happens to the diﬀer-
10Table 1. The eﬀect of REA on life-insurance holdings for diﬀerent types of
households
Without REA With REA Eﬀect on life insurance
No survivor annuity No survivor annuity Positive
No survivor annuity Survivor annuity Ambiguous
Survivor Annuity Survivor annuity Positive
group that would have not chosen a survivor annuity before REA nor af-
t e rR E Ai st h em o s ti n t u i t i v e . I nt h i s case, a story consistent with the
bargaining model is that by promising more life insurance (and also more
consumption in both periods) the husband “buys” the consent signature of
his wife. In the second group, the eﬀect on REA on the outside options is
large enough to change their annuity choice. As shown in Appendix, it is
perfectly possible that the redistribution of this outside option leads to a
large change in the solution of the bargaining game.21 Thus the eﬀect on
the life insurance holdings of the second group is ambiguous. For the third
group, who would have already chosen survivor annuities without REA,
the eﬀect on life insurance comes also from the increased outside option of
the wife. Even though she was suﬃciently well oﬀ in the case of negotia-
t i o nb r e a k d o w ne v e nb e f o r eR E At of o r c et h eh u s b a n dt os e l e c ta ns u r v i v o r
annuity, the fact that REA gave her new property rights in the negotiation
breakdown state, makes her even better oﬀ in the solution. This implies that
the life insurance holdings must go up since her consumption goes up.22
ent components of the households assets after the husband’s death, so using the narrow
deﬁnition ensures that they are two state contingent assets that deliver income in the
widowhood state.
21This can be illustrated by the following example: say that the value of the survivor
annuity from the pension is $10. The signature requirement redistributed this amount
of outside option wealth from husband to wife. It is perfectly possibly that the value of
wife’s aggregate consumption across diﬀerent states in the solution of the bargaining game
changes by more than $10. This can happen when the outside option utilities are very
wealth elastic.
22No claim is made that Nash-bargaining or eﬃcient-contracting models are the only
sensible models that have these predictions. An alternative, more psychological ori-
ented, model having similar predictions is the following. Suppose that before the REA’s
signature-requirement some husbands declined the survivor annuities without really ac-
knowledging the consequences of the choice they made. Assume that the REA’s signature
requirement conveyed the information to the pension holder that the choice of survivor
annuity was very important and forced him to seriously think about the consequences of
his potential death to his wife. Thus instead of an eﬀect through bargaining the REA
migh had an eﬀect by making agents to take more eﬃcient action through providing more
114 Empirical Results
The predictions of the Nash-bargaining model are tested against the pre-
dictions of the classical single utility maximization model and the “almost
dictatorial” model in this section. Outcomes studied from cross-sections
of married couples include survivor annuity choice and life insurance hold-
ings.23 Identiﬁcation strategy in these regressions is based on either the
husband’s birth year or the start-date of his pension. Where the data per-
mit, households in which husband is not receiving pensions (and will not
receive in the future) are used as a control group. This allows us to use both
standard ﬁrst-diﬀerence and diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences empirical strategies.
The data-sets used in this section include Health and Retirement Survey
and Assets (HRS), Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old (AHEAD),
Current Population Survey (CPS) December 1989 Pension Beneﬁt Survey
and CPS March ﬁles from several years. Evidence from published tables on
the annuity selections of TIAA-CREF participants are also presented.
4.1 Outcomes, population studied and empirical identiﬁca-
tion
The outcomes studied in this section are:
1. The probability (conditional on the husband having a pension) that
the husband’s pension provides survivor beneﬁts;
2. The probability that the wife receives life insurance payments should
her husband die;
3. The amount of life insurance protection.
The classical single utility function model gives a stark prediction that
t h el a ws h o u l dn o th a v ea ﬀected any of these outcomes. The Nash-bargaining
model predicts an increase in joint annuitization. Furthermore, for most
information.
23Results on household net worth were also studied. No eﬀects of the legislation were
found. This is not surprising, given that none of the models in the previous section make
strong predictions about the savings behavior and that net worth is not necessarily very
good proxy for savings behavior.
12households24 the Nash-bargaining model predicts increase in the life insur-
ance holdings (so also the second and third outcomes should increase due to
the legislation).25
The population studied is married couples whose husband was born be-
tween 1916-1919 (old group) or between 1924-1931 (young group). The
reason for the omission of the 1920-1923 birth cohort is described later in
this section. The sample (where the data allow this) was further restricted
to married couples who were married when the husband turned 60 to elim-
inate couples who might have not been married at the time of the annuity
selection. Due to relatively low number of couples marrying after age 60,
this criterion has very little eﬀect on the sample.
The receipt of pension income by the husband is the key quantity in the
analyses.26 When annuity choice is studied, only those who had pension
income are included in the sample. When other outcomes are studied, the
pension variable is used to divide the data into control and experimental
groups. While using non-pension holders as a control group for pension
holders is not an ideal control strategy, the inclusion of a rich set of covariates
(like career high earnings of the spouses) should mitigate problems related
to the diﬀerences between these groups.27 Furthermore, the set of non-
aﬀected household in the control group includes many participants of deﬁned
contribution plans who chose to have their pension distributed as a lump
sum instead of an annuity and who are a priori in many aspects more similar
to the experimental group than the households where husband never had any
pension coverage.
24That is, for households that did not change their annuity choice because of the law
change. According to the estimates of this section, these households constitute approxi-
mately 93% of the households in which the husband has pension income.
25It would also be interesting to study the eﬀects of the legislation on the outcomes of
widows using data on transitions to widowhood. This was attempted using the Survey of
Income and Program Participation panels from years 1985 to 1996 (10 diﬀerent panels),
but even these large data sets would give only 686 transitions that satisfy all the necessary
age restrictions to be informative about the eﬀects of the legislation. Unfortunately, with
such small sample size, no statistically signiﬁcant (nor of any consistent sign for the
legislative eﬀect) results were obtained.
26The cohorts studied are suﬃciently old in the data (at least 66) to be very likely to
have already started their pensions, which is important for our purposes, since it implies
that they have already made their annuity selection.
27One would expect that the pension coverage is more likely for those who worked in
highly unionized industries or in high paying professions.
13For all outcomes the following regression is estimated using only house-
holds where the husband had pension income:
Y = α + β ∗ young + η ∗ Z + ε, (2)
where, Y is the dependent variable (either an indicator for survivor ben-
eﬁts from pension, or an indicator for having life insurance, or the amount of
life insurance holdings), young is an indicator for the husband being young
enough to be aﬀected by the legislation and Z is the set of covariates.28 The
full covariate set in all these regressions includes non-linear controls for age
diﬀerences between spouses, third-order polynomials in career high earnings
of the spouses (including interaction terms), an indicator for wife having
no work history, educational and race indicators and an indicator for the
wife having a pension (or expecting one) of her own. The regressions are
estimated with a varying number of covariates in the model. The model
estimated is the standard ﬁrst diﬀerence model (where the diﬀerence is with
respect to birth cohort of the husband) and where β is the estimated eﬀect
of the legislation.
For outcomes other than annuity selection the following model using all
the observations are estimated:29
Y = α + β0 ∗ young + β1 ∗ pension + (3)
β2 ∗ (young ∗ pension)+η ∗ Z + ε,
where pension is an indicator for husband having a pension and β2 is the
program eﬀect. Here the full covariate set also indicators for the husband’s
birth year (since the identiﬁcation is no longer based solely on the birth
year).30 This estimation strategy can be seen as a standard diﬀerence-in-
diﬀerences strategy, where the ﬁrst diﬀerence is between cohorts and the
second is between pension statuses of the husband.
28Even though the dependent variable is in many cases a binary variable, these re-
gressions were estimated using OLS. As a robustness check, they were also estimated as
Probits. All the qualitative results of the analysis were unaﬀected by the choice between
Probit and the linear probability model estimated by OLS.
29The control group did not face the annuity selection, so they cannot be used a control
for annuity selection.
30When birth year indicators are included in the regression they replace the variable
young . However, due to the limited sample size, the interaction terms with pension -
variable are not estimated separately for each birth year even in this case. Instead the
interaction young ∗ pension is still used.
14An exception to the empirical strategies described above is the annuity
selection equation estimated from the CPS 1989 Pension Beneﬁt Survey.31
There an indicator variable for the pension starting after 1985 was used
instead of the cohort proxy. This speciﬁcation allows the use of the husband’s
birth year in the covariate set.
As described above, in most regressions the birth year of the husband is
used as a proxy for whether the husband’s pension started before January
1985. The empirical justiﬁcation for this comes from the yearly March CPS
ﬁles from 1976 to 1998. The probability of a pension income receipt from
federal or private pensions is calculated for married males as a function of
their age. These results are presented in the Figure 1. From these results
we can deduce the information presented in the Table 2.
Table 2. Approximate propability of having a pension income as a function
of the husband’s age
Pension Percent
At age 54 4%
At age 62 15%
At age 66 38%
Ever 40%
The evidence from this relatively-stable relationship across years seem
to suggest that most of pension starts happen when husband is between 62
and 65. Based on that information the observations were divided into three
categories according to the husband’s age. These categories are presented
in Table 3. Only the cohorts listed were used in the analysis.
31The described husband’s birth cohort restrictions do not apply to this case either,
since we do not have to rely on the birth cohort for identiﬁcation with this data.
15Table 3. Age cohorts.
Husband’s Age on
January 1, 1985 Status
54-61 “After” group (young)
62-65 Omitted middle group
















Figure 1: Probability of private, union or federal pension receipt for married
men as function of age.
164.2 Data Sources
The Current Population Survey (CPS) December 1989 Pension Beneﬁt Sur-
vey is a special supplement to the CPS collected for the purpose of analyzing
the eﬀects of the Retirement Equity Act. It includes detailed pension in-
formation (including the start date of beneﬁts) and information on whether
each pension provides survivor beneﬁts. Because this survey was collected
only four years after the law change it is subject to fewer sample selection
problems than other datasets such as HRS-AHEAD.32 Ideally one would
like to analyze a question like selection of survivor annuities from ﬂow data
(or from a panel that tracks individuals as they make their choices). The
downside of CPS 1989 data is that it does not include information on life
insurance holdings, but it does include information on the career high earn-
ings, which is a key covariate in the regressions.
The Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) and the Assets and Health
Dynamics among Oldest of the Old (AHEAD) panels are the main sources of
data in this paper. HRS and AHEAD started as separate panels in 1992 and
1993. AHEAD started as a panel survey of households in which at least one
of the members was over 70 years old at the time of the ﬁrst interview (born
in 1923 or earlier). HRS started as a panel of households having at least
one member born between 1931-1941. Before 1998 there was one additional
AHEAD wave (1995) and two additional HRS waves (1994 and 1996). In
the HRS 1998 these two panels were merged and additional cohorts were
included in the panel to have a representative sample of households were at
least one member was born before 1947. It is important to note that most
individuals who are young enough to be aﬀected by the law change are only
part of the HRS 1998 data. The advantage of HRS-AHEAD data is the
detailed information on the work histories, pensions and life insurance and
assets holdings.
The HRS-AHEAD data were used in two separate ways in the empirical
32The mechanism for sample selection is the following: suppose husbands have private
information on their life expectancy and this information enters into the decision whether
to select survivor annuity (with these more likely to die soon more prone to select survivor
annuities). Then any cross-section attempt to estimate the eﬀect of the start year (or
birth cohort group) on annuity selection will be biased since the earlier the start year is
(or the older the birth cohort is), the higher the proportion of those who chose survivor
annuities because of the private negative information on their life expectancy and have
died before reaching the data collection. This leads to a bias towards the ﬁnding that
among later pension starter a higher fraction choose survivor annuities.
17analysis. A cross-sectional estimation of the eﬀect of legislation uses the HRS
1998. However, the mortality bias for the older group could be signiﬁcant in
this approach, since the members of the older group would have to have lived
to be 79-82 to be included in the sample. For this reason the eﬀects of the law
change are also estimated using data for the older group from the ﬁrst wave
of AHEAD and data from HRS 98 for the younger group. Although not a
perfect solution , this approach could reduce the mortality bias substantially.
Ideally one would like to compare similarly aged individuals at diﬀerent
times, but this is not possible given the existing datasets. The ages of the
older and younger group at the times of diﬀerent surveys is reported in Table
4.
Table 4. Age of the compared cohorts in the ﬁrst wave of AHEAD and in
the HRS 98. The preferred comparison is between the oﬀ-diagonal cells of
this table
.
Data-set Age of the young Age of the Old
AHEAD 1 62-69 (not part of the sample) 74-77
HRS 98 67-74 79-82
4.3 Results
4.3.1 Survivor Annuity Selection
Evidence on annuity selection are presented from three diﬀerent data sources.
The ﬁrst data source is a published table of annuity choices by TIAA-CREF
participants (TIAA-CREF 1996), where the data is tabulated according to
the start year of the pension. The other data-sources are the CPS 1989
December Supplement and the HRS-AHEAD data, described above.
The evidence from TIAA-CREF ﬂow data is presented in Figure 2. Be-
tween 1978 and 1994 selection of survivor annuities went from 56.5% to 74%,
an increase of 17.5 percentage points. More than half of the total change (9
percentage points) occurred between 1984 and 1986. This suggest that while
there was an pre-existing trend in the data, the legislation had a substantial
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Figure 2: Percentage of male TIAA-CREF Participants choosing survivor
annuities as a function of the year when started receiving beneﬁts.
this data include also non-married participants and the workers from state
universities (and certain church-run universities) who were not aﬀected by
the legislation.
The CPS 1989 December Supplement was used in a General Accounting
Oﬃce Report (GAO 1992) studying the eﬀects of REA on the selection of
survivor annuities. Based on simple tabulation, the GAO estimated that
the selection of survivor annuities increased by 15 percentage points after
the legislation. Two caveats on the GAO analysis are in order. First, the
GAO included all the observations in the analysis regardless of how long
ago the selection was made, which can lead to a mortality bias. This choice
would also attribute any eﬀects of possible existing trends in the data to
REA, while the exclusive use of more recent years (where data appears
19Table 5: Probability that husband's pension provides survivor benefits
CPS 89 December Supplement
Start year of pension Raw series Regresssion adjusted
79 65% 65% 65% 64%
80 74% 75% 74% 73%
81 67% 67% 66% 66%
82 66% 67% 66% 66%
83 71% 72% 70% 69%
84 71% 71% 71% 71%
85 68% 68% 67% 67%
86 72% 73% 72% 72%
87 76% 77% 75% 74%
88 84% 85% 83% 84%
89 81% 82% 79% 79%
Age dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Race No No Yes Yes
Education No No Yes Yes
Income variables No No No Yes
relatively stationary except for the eﬀect of REA), should at least mitigate
this problem. Secondly, the 15 percentage points increase in survivor annuity
selection is based on a comparison of the highest after-legislation fraction of
choosing survivor annuities (for years 1988-1989) with the average fraction
of all before legislation choices. The use of this latest and highest value is
only correct if the legislation took some time to have an eﬀect on the choices.
Since the sample sizes are small enou g hf o rt h ed a t at ob ef a i r l yn o i s y ,a
more conservative estimate would use all years after 1985 to estimate the
eﬀect of the legislation and not the arbitrary highest.
Our estimates from CPS 1989 December Supplement are presented in
Tables 5 and 6, and in Figure 3. The sample used diﬀers from the GAO’s
study in that only observations in which the husband started his pension
between 1979-1989 are used and federal employees are included in the sample
since the law aﬀecting them changed at the same time as REA was enacted
(as explained in Section 2).33 Across diﬀerent speciﬁcations these results
33The inclusion of federal employees does not aﬀect the qualitative estimates.
20suggest that the selection of survivor annuities went up by 7 percentage
points after the law change. This result is robust to the choice of covariate
set and is statistically signiﬁcant.34
The results from the HRS-AHEAD data are presented in Table 7. These
estimates suggest that signature requirement increased the selection of sur-
vivor annuities by 5-10 percentage points. These results range from statisti-
cally insigniﬁcant to signiﬁcant at the 1% level depending on the data used
and the speciﬁcation estimated.
The magnitude of estimated eﬀect is not very large. This natural given
that already before the legislation a majority of married husband were choos-
ing survivor beneﬁts (approximately 70 percent).35
Among the covariates, it is interesting to note that if the wife has a
pension on her own or is expecting a pension, her husband is less likely to
provide survivor beneﬁts through his pension. This holds for both datasets
and is statistically signiﬁcant in both datasets.
Having higher education level (both for husband and wife) in general
seem to imply that the selection of survivor beneﬁts is more likely. These
education eﬀe c t sa r en o ta l w a y ss i g n i ﬁcant. In the preferred models (regres-
sion with all the covariates and in case of HRS-AHEAD comparing between
AHEAD Wave 1 and HRS 98), the point estimate for the eﬀect of education
is approximately 13 (CPS) or 20 (HRS-AHEAD) percentage points increase
in the probability of selecting survivor beneﬁts when the comparison is be-
tween a couple where neither ﬁnished high school and a couple where both
graduated college.
34Ad i ﬀerence-in-diﬀerences strategy with CPS 1989 data was also tried, where the
control group was state and local government workers who were not aﬀected by the law
changes. The estimates of the program eﬀect were similar in magnitude as the ﬁrst
diﬀerence estimates but not statistically signiﬁcant. This is probably due to the small
sample of state and local workers in the data (328). It is thus not very surprising that
the eﬀects are made non-signiﬁcant by the inclusion of the control group, since in practice
the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimator just subtracts a very noisy measure of change in
proportion for state and local workers from the ﬁrst diﬀerence estimate discussed in the
preceding paragraph.
35In the HRS-AHEAD data the proportion selecting survivor beneﬁts is on the average
approximately 5 percentage points less than in CPS 1989. One possible interpretation
for at least some of this diﬀerence is that HRS-AHEAD data, having been collected later
than CPS 1989, suﬀers more from the mortality bias.
21Table 6: Results on probability that husband's pension
 provides survivor benefits (CPS 89 December Supplement)
1985 or after 0.069 0.071 0.070 0.063
(0.025)** (0.025)** (0.025)** (0.025)*
Husband black 0.027 0.042 0.046
(0.060) (0.058) (0.059)
Husband hispanic -0.012 0.017 0.014
(0.081) (0.084) (0.084)
High-school husband -0.022 -0.018
(0.058) (0.057)
High-school wife 0.012 0.023
(0.046) (0.046)
High-school both 0.036 0.033
(0.068) (0.068)
College husband 0.118 0.096
(0.039)** (0.039)*
College wife 0.088 0.106
(0.064) (0.063)
College both -0.102 -0.110
(0.086) (0.085)
Wife has pension -0.081
(0.038)*
Age controls No Yes Yes Yes
Income variables No No No Yes
N 1540 1540 1540 1540
R2 0.0060 0.026 0.0409  0.0581
N.B ** and * indicate significance of coefficient at 5% and 1% 
confidence levels. Below the coefficient is its estimated
standard error of the coefficient.
22Figure 3: Percentage of married man choosing survivor annuities
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Raw Series Regression Adjusted
These results on increased joint-annuitization are consistent with the
bargaining model and with the “almost dictatorial” model. They constitute
a rejection of the standard single-utility function model of the household.
However, the magnitude of estimated eﬀect is not very large. This natural
given that already before the legislation a majority of married husband were
choosing survivor beneﬁts (approximately 70 percent).
4.3.2 Probability of having life insurance protection for the wife
From HRS-AHEAD ﬁrst-diﬀerence and diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences models were
estimated for the probability that the husband has life insurance policy
in which the wife is listed among the beneﬁciaries. With the exception of
23Table 7: Results on the probability that husband's pension provides survivor benefits
From HRS-AHEAD
Comparison between
Crossection 1993 and 1998 Crossection in 1998
Husband young 0.048 0.082 0.077 0.047 0.091 0.101
(0.038) (0.043) (0.047) (0.044) (0.048) (0.050)*
Husband black 0.081 0.105 0.051 0.073
(0.060) (0.062) (0.063) (0.065)
Husband hispanic -0.040 -0.046 -0.122 -0.122
(0.097) (0.097) (0.103) (0.103)
High-school husband 0.072 0.076 0.121 0.120
(0.053) (0.054) (0.053)* (0.055)*
High-school wife 0.142 0.162 0.097 0.111
(0.057)* (0.056)** (0.060) (0.060)
High-school both -0.113 -0.136 -0.076 -0.089
(0.074) (0.074) (0.079) (0.079)
College husband 0.079 0.077 0.014 0.012
(0.052) (0.053) (0.055) (0.056)
College wife -0.081 -0.077 -0.080 -0.073
(0.075) (0.076) (0.078) (0.081)
College both 0.086 0.094 0.141 0.144
(0.091) (0.091) (0.094) (0.096)
Wife has pension -0.101 -0.082
(0.039)* (0.040)*
Age controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Income variables No No Yes No No Yes
N 1001 1001 999 913 913 911
R2 0.0021 0.0403 0.0579 0.0014 0.0541 0.0707
Probability that husband's
pension provides survivor benefits
Age in 1985
54-61 69.1%  
66-69 64.3% from 1993 data










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































%the ﬁrst-diﬀerence estimator across HRS and AHEAD data (in which the
old group is from AHEAD Wave 1), no signiﬁcant eﬀect on this margin is
found. The point estimates from diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence models are slightly
negative, but given their standard errors, they are consistent also with large
positive eﬀects. The results are presented in Table 8.
It is interesting to note that the probability of having life insurance is
signiﬁcantly higher across all speciﬁcations for households in which husband
has pension income. This might reﬂect better access to the group life in-
surance market through former employers. Other signiﬁcant result is that
husband being Hispanic has a huge negative eﬀect on the probability of
having life-insurance. This is consistent with the results of Bernheim et
al (1999) who ﬁnd using the ﬁrst wave of the HRS (1992) that non-white
households are more likely to be underinsured.36 However, the eﬀect of hus-
band being African-American on the probability of having life insurance is
approximately zero.
The results on education are mostly non-signiﬁcant, with high school
education (either for the wife or the husband) increasing the probability of
having life insurance. The eﬀect of having college education is more mixed,
but given the precision of the eﬀects-of-education coeﬃcients, these results
are only tentative in nature. In the preferred model (regression with all
the covariates, comparing between AHEAD Wave 1 and HRS 98), the point
estimate for the eﬀect of education is approximately 9 percentage points
increase in the probability of life insurance protection when the comparison
is between a couple where neither ﬁnished high school and a couple where
both graduated college.
4.3.3 The Amount of life insurance Protection
From HRS-AHEAD both ﬁrst diﬀerence and diﬀerence in diﬀerences models
were estimated for the value of life insurance protection of life insurance
plans where the wife is listed as a beneﬁciary (note that zero values were
included since that is a valid amount of life insurance protection).37 Three
36Underinsured in their vocabulary means having less life insurance protection than their
behavioral model would predict being optimal. Thus the use of the term underinsurance
carries a normative judgement.
37Missing values in the face value of life insurance pose an interesting problem in the






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0diﬀerent statistical models were estimated: standard linear regression by
OLS, median regression and a version of robust regression that uses biweight-
weighting scheme to downweight outliers (Hamilton 1991). The latter two
models are estimated to ensure that the results are not driven by small
number of outliers. The results are presented in Tables 9 and 10.
The results for life insurance protection seem to imply that the law
change increased by approximately $5,000 (preferred median regression es-
timate).38 The magnitude and signiﬁcance of this estimate varies across
diﬀerent models, the OLS estimates being signiﬁcantly larger but statisti-
cally non-signiﬁcant and the robust regression results being smaller than
those of the median regression.39 The results from the median regressions
are always statistically diﬀerent from zero as are the results from the ro-
bust regressions when the model is estimated using both AHEAD Wave 1
and HRS 98. This result of increased life insurance protection is consistent
with the Nash-bargaining model of household behavior and inconsistent with
both the classical model and the “almost dictatorial model”.40
insurance, but we do not know the face value of the plan. The results reported here don’t
use these observations. However, similar results were obtained by imputing the median
of the positive life insurance values for the missing value. This suggest that the tendency
not to report value of life insurance seems to be uncorrelated with the treatment variable
young ∗ pension.
38This would correspond roughly to 10 times the husband’s median monthly pension.
39T h ef a c tt h a tw eﬁnd a positive results on the average life insurance holdings, but no
eﬀect on the probability of having life insurance is not consistent with the Nash-bargaining
model if we take the point estimates to be the true values. This observation is not very
damaging to the empirical validity of the Nash-bargaining model and could be just due
to sample variation (remember that the point estimate for the eﬀect on the probability of
having life insurance is very imprecise). The Nash-bargaining model predicts that every
household (with the potential exception of the approximately 7% of the households who
changed their annuity choice) should increase their life insurance holdings. For many
households the non-negativity constraint of life insurance holdings is binding in reality
(this constraint was not taken into account in the model). It is possible that for many
of them the change brought on by REA is small enough not to make them hold positive
amounts of life insurance. For the households already holding life insurance, the Nash-
model predicts that all of them should increase their life insurance holdings. Thus it should
be easier to detect the change in the latter variable. In statistical terms this is similar as
saying that converting life insurance holdings into a binary variable uses less eﬃciently the
sample information available on the life insurance holdings, since the conversion discards
relevant information.
40Some authors (e.g. Turner 1988) have argued that the increase in selection of joint
annuities around 1985 was not caused by the requirements of Retirement Equity Act,
but by the Supreme Courts Decision in 1983 to require the use of unisex life table in the







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































7Similar results as in the previous section regarding the covariates hold
for these regressions. Husband being Hispanic has a negative eﬀect on the
amount life insurance protection (approximately $7,000 less in the median
regression case). This eﬀect is signiﬁcant across speciﬁcations .Now also
having African-American husband is weakly related to less insurance cov-
erage. In the preferred formulation, where the AHEAD Wave 1 is used for
the older cohort, this eﬀect is not statistically signiﬁcant. When the pure
cross section model from HRS 98 is estimated, the eﬀect is signiﬁcant. The
magnitude of this eﬀect varies across speciﬁcations in the median regression
case from $100 less insurance to $3,500 less insurance coverage. As in the
previous section, these results are consistent with the ﬁndings of Bernheim
et al (1999).
The eﬀect of education of the spouses on the amount of life insurance
holdings is generally positive (although not all the coeﬃcients estimated are
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero). In the preferred model (median regres-
sion with all the covariates, comparing between AHEAD Wave 1 and HRS
98), the point estimate for the eﬀect of education is approximately $16,000
increase in the life insurance holdings when the comparison is between a cou-
ple where neither ﬁnished high school and a couple where both graduated
college.
A general point about all the models estimated (survivor annuity choice,
and the probability and the amount of life insurance) is that the covariates
have surprisingly little eﬀect on either the magnitude or the signiﬁcance of
the estimated program eﬀect. This is evidence for the control strategy used
here being successful, at least in the observable-characteristics-space, the
diﬀerences (or diﬀerential trends) between control group and experimental
group do not seem to be driving our results.
participants this made joint life annuities relatively less expensive as compared with the
single life annuity. However, the increase in life-insurance holdings would be hard to justify
based on the unisex decision reasoning, since life insurance and survivor annuities are
near-perfect substitutes. In a classical model of household behavior, if we assume that
life insurance and survivor annuities are Hicksian substitutes, then life insurance holdings
should go down when the price of survivor annuities goes down, unless the income eﬀect
dominates. Furthermore, the price shock for most pension plans was likely to be small
since the unisex decision called for the use of unisex tables within each pension plan, so
that the unisex table used could incorporate the gender composition of the risk pool in
the calculation.
305C o n c l u s i o n
This paper presented a tractable Nash-bargaining model for household de-
cision making over survivor protection. The model made two speciﬁcp r e -
dictions regarding the eﬀects of the Retirement Equity Act on the choices
that households make: the selection of joint-annuities would increase, and,
for most households, life-insurance holdings would increase. These predic-
tions are in stark contrast with the predictions of the classical single-utility-
function maximization model. Using several microdata sources it is shown
the predictions of the Nash-bargaining model are conﬁrmed. This consti-
tutes a rejection of the single-utility maximization model of household be-
havior in this decision-making realm.
These results imply that the change in the selection of survivor annuities
were not the only eﬀect of the Retirement Equity Act. The increase in
life-insurance holdings through the household bargaining mechanism, while
increasing income security for widows, was neither foreseen nor intended by
the legislation. In this, there is an important lesson for policy making that
targets the resource allocation within a family. Because we do not yet fully
understand the decision-making dynamics in the family, policies can have
unanticipated eﬀects due to the household decision-making process. The
model and the empirical results presented here take the literature one step
closer to understanding this process and its implications.
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33Appendix: Results relating to the Nash-bargaining
model
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2 and ˆ c
f
2 are respectively, ﬁrst-period consumption, second-period con-
sumption in the state where husband is alive, and second-period consump-
tion in the wife’s widowhood. In all proofs below we assume that utility
functions are concave and twice diﬀerentiable and that there is some mar-
ital surplus to be shared in the optimum (so the outside options do not
bind).41
Lemma 1 states an obvious feature of the Nash-bargaining solution.
Lemma 1. Each agent’s utility is increasing in his outside option and
decreasing in his partner’s outside option.
Proof: Deﬁne the utility possibility frontier by gf = K(gm),w h e r egf
and gm are the utility levels of the wife and husband respectively. Now the
maximization can be written as
max
gn (K(gm) − hf)(gm − hm). (5)
From the ﬁrst order condition and from the fact that K0 ≤ 0 it follows
that gm is increasing in hm and decreasing in hf.
41The assumption that the family members’ utility functions are of time-separable ex-
pected utility form is not crucial to the results. An alternative way to obtain the results
of this appendix would be to assume that each partner has a general utility function over
their own consumption (with no within family externalities) and to break down the process
into two components: wealth sharing between spouses and individual utility maximization
for given individual wealth share. The additional assumption needed is that the individual
utility functions are such that the utility maximization for a single individual having same
preferences generates demand functions that are increasing in lifetime wealth.
34To save on notation we will introduce a notational device that also high-
lights the link between Nash-bargaining solution and the eﬃcient-contracting
solution by writing the problem in the general form (originally from Chiap-
pori 1988a).
Lemma 2. Any Nash-bargaining solution in which the outside options














gf − hf (7)
and gm and gf are now the utility levels attained by the husband and
wife in the Nash-bargaining solution.
Proof: The maximization of the Equation 6 has same ﬁrst-order condi-
tion as the Nash-bargaining solution.
Lemma 3. In the solution of maximization of Equation 6, the husband’s
utility is increasing in λ.
Proof: Similar to the proof of Lemma 1.
Proposition 1. REA increases the utility of wife and decreases the util-
ity of husband.
Proof: Since REA increases the wife’s outside option and decreases the
husband’s outside option, the results follows from Lemma 1.
Since from Lemmas 1 and 3 it follows that increasing the wife’s (hus-
band’s) outside option has qualitatively similar eﬀect as a decrease (increase)
of λ Proposition 2 will be proved using the weighted sum of utilities form of
the problem.
Proposition 2. REA increases the amount of money transferred to the
survivor state (the sum of survivor annuities and life insurance) and increase
35the wife’s private consumption in periods 1 and 2. The eﬀect on savings is
ambiguous.
Proof: Consider the maximization of Equation 6 subject to a budget













where ﬁrst-period consumption is the numeraire and the p function gives
the price of each consumption good in terms of ﬁrst-period consumption. For
concave u and v functions and for an unchanged budget set, an decrease in
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2 and also decrease cm
1 and cm
2 .
The eﬀect on savings (deﬁned as resources not consumed during period 1)
depends on the relative magnitudes of the second derivatives of ufand um
functions, since these quantities determine whether the wife’s consumption
in period 1 will increase by more than the husband’s consumption in period
1 will decrease.42
Lemma 4: A redistribution of wealth between spouses in the state where
the negotiation breaks down can lead to changes in the allocation of total
consumption that is either smaller or larger than the amount redistributed.
Proof: As in lemma 1, write the optimization problem as
max
gm (K(gm) − hf((1 − α)W))(gm − hm(αW)), (9)
42An alternative way to prove the ﬁrst part of Proposition 2, that also highlights the
structure of the model considered here, is the following. Since the utility functions of the
spouses are not interdependent and all the solutions considered are Pareto-eﬃcient, we can
consider the solution as a two-stage procedure, where in stage 1 the wealth is distributed
within the family and in stage 2 both spouses make independently their consumption and
investment decisions. Now the eﬀect of the REA can be seen as a transfer of income to
the wife. Given the additive separable structure of the individual utility functions, all the
components of the individual demands are normal (increasing in wealth). Hence all the
husband’s demand components decrease (since husband gets less money) and all the wife’s
demand components increase.
36where now the outside options are functions of the wealth-sharing rule
of the household should the negotiation break down. Redistributing wealth
towards the husband is an increase in α. Now it is clear that the comparative
statics of gm with respect to α depend (for a given utility possibility frontier)
on the magnitude of the ﬁrst derivatives of the hf and hm functions. The
larger these derivatives are, the more gm (and the consumption components
of the husband) will respond. The response is zero if the derivatives are
zero and increases without bound when the derivatives jointly go to inﬁnity,
so the magnitude of the eﬀect of redistribution is not restricted by our
assumptions.
Lemma 4 provides justiﬁcation for the result that households which,
due to the REA, changed their annuity selection, could also have increased
the life-insurance holdings (so that provision of a given amount of survivor
protection in the case of negotiation breakdown can lead to a larger increase
of survivor protection in the optimum). With our assumptions, the eﬀect of
a small redistribution of the of outside options can have any size eﬀect on
the solution, from negligible to huge.
However, there exists a special case where we can derive stronger result
than the ambiguity result of Lemma 4. Let gm,g f,h m and hf still be the
utility levels, but now expressed as indirect utilities over wealth that the
spouses command in the solution of the bargaining and in the negotiation-
breakdown-case. Furthermore assume that hm(Wm)=gm(Wm) − am and
hf(Wf)=gf(Wf)−af,w h e r eam and af are just additive constant (additive
utility of being in the cooperative marriage).43 Now it is a relatively easy
calculation to show that if gm(Wm)=Wm and gf(Wf)=Wf, then a
redistribution of $1 in the outside option case leads to a redistribution of
$1 in the solution. Furthermore, since all demand components are normal,
it leads to a change in every demand component that is less than $1. Thus
under this special case, the REA should decrease life insurance holdings for
the households that change their annuity selection.
43The assumption that indirect utility function could be expressed as simply the wealth
level is, as longs as we don’t consider price changes, only an assumption about the right
cardinalization of the preferences for the Nash-bargaining solution and not an assumption
about the underlying preference structure over the diﬀerent consumption goods.
37